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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine whether adult education delays retirement and increases 
labour force participation among the elderly, a mechanism suggested in the OECD 
strategy for “active ageing” and the “Lisbon strategy” of the EU. Using register data 
from Sweden, we analyse transcripts from adult education for the period 1979–2004 
and annual earnings 1982–2004. We match samples of treated individuals, in adult 
education 1986–1989, and untreated on the propensity score. The timing of exit from 
the workforce is assessed by non-parametric estimation of survival rates in the labour 
force. The results indicate no effects of adult education on the timing of retirement. 
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2  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? 1  Introduction 
In developed economies, increasing shares of the population are entering retirement 
rather than engaging in productive work. As a result, to ensure future individual and 
societal welfare, it may be crucial to delay the average age of transition from the 
labour force into retirement. To improve incentives related to delaying retirement age, 
governments in many countries have already issued changes in pension systems. In 
addition to such policies, the OECD proposes measures related to the concept of 
“active aging”, e.g. measures to encourage the retraining of older workers (OECD, 
1998, 2001). Similar reasoning is present in the European Union’s “Lisbon strategy” 
for growth and jobs (EU 2007, 2008). The underlying view is that inadequate 
education, particularly among low-skilled individuals, is an important cause for early 
retirement because it increases the risk of becoming unemployed and decreases an 
individual’s chances of receiving job offers.  
The purpose of this paper is to study whether adult education at the compulsory or 
upper secondary level (henceforth AE) that takes place at the age of 42 or later affects 
the timing of the transition from productive work to a life financed by pensions. To 
our knowledge, this topic has not been previously addressed, presumably because it 
requires very long time-series data on earnings and training. The analysis is based on 
Swedish register data of AE transcripts from 1979 to 2004 and labour earnings from 
1982 to 2004. Sweden is a suitable country for our study because, since 1969, the 
Swedish government has mandated that municipalities offer education for adults at the 
compulsory and upper secondary levels. Participation is free of charge, and full-time 
students are eligible to apply for financial support amounting to about €780 per month 
(2004 prices); one-third of this amount is a grant, and the rest is a loan with favourable 
conditions.
1 In the 1980s, around 100,000 individuals were enrolled annually. 
Although these numbers include those who were only enrolled in just a single course, 
it can be compared to the roughly 300,000 adolescents enrolled in regular upper 
secondary school for youths. In an international comparison, participation in AE is 
high in Sweden. 
 
                                                 
1 For instance, the interest rate is below the market rate and required repayments never exceed 4 per cent of 
earnings. 
IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market?  3 According to human capital theory, individuals invest in education at any point during 
the life cycle if the present value of benefits from education exceeds the costs (Becker 
1962). Education is assumed to increase productivity and therefore to increase an 
individual’s wages. On the cost side, time in education invokes foregone earnings 
besides the direct costs for education. A general implication of restrictive versions of 
human capital theory is that the returns to additional investments in education decrease 
with an individual’s age. This is because the individual has fewer remaining years in 
the workforce and because of increased foregone earnings (Becker, 1993). These 
circumstances may question the rationale of policies promoting AE later in life. 
However, even if returns decrease with age, they may still be positive for older 
workers. In addition, extending the earlier versions of the human capital model to 
include factors like changes in information, relative wages, preferences, health and/or 
borrowing constraints (Altonji, 1993, Iwahashi, 2004, Killingsworth, 1982, Monks, 
1998, Sjögren and Sällström, 2004, Wallace and Ihnen, 1975, Weiss, 1971), it is 
possible that the returns to education do not fall monotonically with age and that the 
optimal timing of substantial investments in education will occur at a fairly late stage 
in the life cycle. Several empirical studies have found that the earnings returns of 
education among individuals above age 40 are comparable to those of younger age 
groups (Jacobson et al., 2005a, 2005b, Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008 and Stenberg, 
2009).
2 However, increased earnings have theoretically ambiguous implications for 
the timing of retirement. In a static model of labour supply, higher income may 
increase the demand for leisure, if leisure is a normal good, and decrease the labour 
supply. In a dynamic setting, assuming that an individual maximises life-time utility 
from income streams from work and income as a retired person, the sign of the effect 
of increased wages on the optimal timing of retirement cannot be determined a priori 
(Stock and Wise 1990). Wage increases affect income both from work and from 
pensions, which may lead to earlier or later retirement depending on, for example, the 
shape of the utility function, subjective time preferences, and the link between income 
from work and pension entitlement.
3  Whether an earnings increase reflects increased 
                                                 
2 Mixed results presented in Albrecht et al. (2004) and Ekström (2003) are reconciled in Stenberg (2009). 
3 In each period, an individual is assumed to compare the expected utility from immediate retirement with the 
utility from retiring at a future date. Workers remain in the labour force as long as the option value of work 
(alternately referred to as the option value of delayed retirement) is positive.  
4  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? productivity or signaling effects (Spence 1973, Weiss 1995) makes no difference in 
this respect. 
Empirical studies tend to suggest that low-skilled individuals are more likely to 
retire early. Among the mechanisms that may explain this pattern, technological 
changes have been claimed to work to the relative disadvantage of older workers 
(Aubert et al., 2006, Borghans and Weel, 2002).
4 AE is potential insurance against 
such a scenario because broadened and updated skills may improve the employability 
of individuals and, from a more long-term perspective, make him/her less sensitive to 
structural changes in labour demand. Indeed, Peracchi and Welch (1994) suggest that 
high-skilled older workers are less likely to leave full-time employment, and Blau 
(1994) finds high-skilled more closely attached to the labour market and less sensitive 
to labour market shocks. These findings may partly reflect the apparent 
complementarity between on-the-job-training and formal education observed among 
older workers by Schils and Fouarge (2007).
5 Another possible explanation is that 
education is correlated with health. Kalwij and Vermeulen (2005) argue that health is 
an important factor in explaining labour force participation among the elderly, while 
Lleras-Muney (2005) shows evidence of education’s causal effect on decreasing 
mortality. Thus, empirical studies point to some potential and intuitively reasonable 
mechanisms lending support to the policy recommendations of the EU and the OECD, 
that is, investment in adult education might postpone the timing of retirement. The aim 
of our analysis is to study whether this view finds support in the data. 
The contribution of the present study is that it directly addresses the issue of 
whether AE prolongs working careers. Unlike earlier studies of the effect of AE on 
earnings, this paper analyses the potential effects on labour supply up to and beyond 
the official retirement age. Irrespective of earnings effects, extending the working life 
for the elderly may mitigate the negative economic and social impacts of ageing 
populations. Moreover, given labour market imperfections, increased labour force 
participation has beneficial effects on the economy at large because it increases 
competition for jobs and moderates labour supply shortages during economic booms. 
 the  However, as pointed out before, the theoretical effects of AE on the transition from
                                                 
4 However, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) find that workers in industries with high rates of technological change 
retire later to recoup the returns on late investments in on-the-job-training; nevertheless, a technological shock 
would (ceteris paribus) induce workers to retire sooner because of increased costs for re-training. 
IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market?  5 work force into retirement are indeterminate. Our main finding in this study is that AE 
has no effect on the timing of retirement from the labour market. This result is stable 
across a number of robustness checks. 
The paper consists of five sections. Section 2 presents the institutional setting, the 
data and the design of the study. The empirical method is specified in Section 3; the 
res
titutional setting, data and definitions 
In Sweden, eligibility for higher education at the university level requires 12 years of 
e years since the 
s and is free of charge. It is primarily of interest to those who 
spe
ults are presented and discussed in Section 4, before some concluding remarks in 
Section 5. 
2  Ins
schooling. It includes compulsory schooling, which has lasted nin
beginning of the 1960s, and three years of upper secondary school. Until the beginning 
of the 1960s, the schooling systems varied somewhat across municipalities, but in 
essence, pupils attended seven or eight years of compulsory school. Pupils with better 
marks were selected to attend junior secondary school (i.e. realskolan) beginning in 
their seventh year. This stage lasted at least three years and was a prerequisite for 
upper secondary school. Those not selected had a second chance to enrol in junior 
secondary school at a later point in time. In our data, each individual’s highest level of 
education attained is described by category, and “9 years of schooling” includes those 
who attended junior secondary school. As for upper secondary school, those with one 
year of upper secondary school are almost exclusively in nursing. Among those with 
two years of upper secondary school, professional trajectories are much more 
diversified, and we distinguish three broad groups, namely, 1) commerce, including 
services and secretarial and office training; 2) manufacturing, which includes 
craftsmanship and technology; and 3) transport, including vehicle engineering and 
media communication.  
Adult schooling at the compulsory and upper secondary levels (AE) is offered by 
all Swedish municipalitie
nt time in school less than or equal to a completed two-year program at the upper 
secondary level. Participants in AE are eligible for study allowances sufficient to cover 
modest living expenses, and employees are entitled by law to be on unpaid leave for 
                                                                                                                                             
5 On-the-job-training typically involves high-skilled individuals (Brunello 2001, Arulampalam et al. 2004).  
6  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? the purpose of attending any kind of training and be reinstated with the same working 
conditions and pay.  
Our data originate from various registers of the Swedish population administered 
by Statistics Sweden. AE course transcripts cover the period 1979-2004, and labour 
earnings 1982-2004. The treatment group is defined as first-time AE enrolees between 
1986 and 1989. During this period, they must have been registered in courses 
amounting to at least 125 course credits, the equivalent of a half-semester of full-time 
study. This definition allows us to consider earnings trajectories prior to 1986 and still 
leaves a 15-year follow-up period. The comparison group consists of individuals who 
were not registered in AE at all or who were registered in courses that amounted to 
less than 125 course credits. The sample of the study is further restricted to individuals 
who were born from 1931 to 1944, i.e. aged 42 to 55 in 1986 and 60 to 73 years old in 
2004. Given that AE is most relevant for low-skilled, our sample of individuals is 
conditioned to have had eleven years of schooling or less in 1985, thus excluding 
about one-third of the population and making all sample members ineligible for 
tertiary education. To further “clean” our analysis, we exclude individuals enrolled in 
AE 1979-1985 or individuals with zero earnings in 1984 and 1985 (i.e., those not 
active on the labour market). The descriptive statistics of treated and comparison 
group members are presented in Table 1. The large number of individuals defined as 
untreated is an advantage because it should ease the process of finding appropriate 
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Table 1 Sample means of treated (AE enrolees) and untreated, males and 
females, in 1985, unless otherwise stated. 
    
  Males Females   
Born 1931-1944  Treated Untreated  p-value
a) Treated Untreated    p-value
a) 
N 1348 354529   4982 334647   
Age in 1986  46.33 48.15 .000  46.92 48.42  .000 
Child(ren) at home   1.272  1.080 .000  1.244 .933  .000 
Less than 9 years of schooling  .373 .588 .000  .280 .470  .000 
9 years of schooling
 b) .142 .083 .000  .115 .118  .514 
1 year of upper secondary school  .022 .009 .000  .302 .127  .000 
2 years of upper secondary school  .464 .320 .000  .302 .285  .005 
- Commerce  .065 .047 .002  .123 .121  .593 
- Manufacturing  .280 .188 .000  .027 .027  .929 
- Transport  .035 .030 .250  .013 .025  .000 
Earnings 1982 (SEK in 1000s)  75.7 79.5 .594  45.4 49.2  .016 
Earnings 1985 (SEK in 1000s)  93.9 101.3 .017  61.4 63.5  .000 
Earnings change 1982 – 1985   21.8 18.3 .648  16.0 14.3  .275 
Foreign-born .162 .110 .000  .107 .113  .000 
Unemployment benefits > 0  .116 .065 .000  .098 .063  .000 
Stockholm county 
c) .177 .150 .005  .174 .159  .004 
Inland of Norrland
 c) .060 .059 .902  .064 .053  .001 
Regional employment (M/F)  .835 .834 .007  .767 .765  .000 
      
Born in 1944      
N 215 31362   647 26992   
Age in 1986  42 42   42 42   
Child(ren) at home  1.519  1.449 .370  1.772  1.529  .000 
Less than 9 years of schooling  .265 .468 .000  .219 .347  .000 
9 years of schooling 
b) .181 .128 .002  .122 .151  .044 
1 year of upper secondary school  .019 .013 .426  .309 .138  .000 
2 years of upper secondary school  .535 .391 .000  .349 .365  .412 
- Commerce  .060 .049 .450  .147 .171  .101 
- Manufacturing  .340 .246 .002  ..034 .034  .946 
- Transport  .037 .034 .770  .015 .023  .181 
Earnings (SEK in 1000s)  90.7 103.5 .001  57.6  64.0  .000 
Earnings diff 1982 – 1985   17.9 26.4 .001  18.9 18.5  .673 
Foreign-born .163 .100 .003  .097 .099  .882 
Unemployment benefits > 0  .126 .070 .002  .114 .069  .000 
Stockholm county
 c) .195 .158 .129  .170 .169  .932 
Inland of Norrland
 c) .037 .055 .256  .060 .048  .169 
Regional employment (M/F)  .837 .834 .029  .767 .766  .403 
a) t-test for equality of means between treated and untreated groups     
b) Including individuals who attended junior secondary school (realskolan), which encompassed up to 10 
years of schooling. 
c) The inland of Norrland is a sparsely populated area in the north of Sweden with permanently higher than 
average unemployment rates. Stockholm County hosts 20 per cent of the population, and the overall 
employment level is higher than in any other region of Sweden. 
 
The descriptives in Table 1 reveal that education late in life is predominantly a female 
phenomenon. We do not explore the potential mechanisms behind this pattern, but 
greater family commitment is likely to be correlated with a greater need and/or desire 
8  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? to go back to school after age 40. Note also that those in AE are on average slightly 
younger by 1.8 years (males) and by 1.5 years (females). We also observe that the 
treated have a higher level of education. This is an expected pattern because earlier 
studies have shown that initial skill level is positively correlated with the willingness 
to participate in adult education (Oosterbeek 1998, OECD 2003, 2006). The 
opportunity costs of participating in AE should also influence the decision to enrol. 
Consequently, treated individuals had lower average earnings in both 1982 and 1985 
and were also more likely to be receiving unemployment benefits during 1985, 
although the fractions doing so are only around 10 per cent.
6 Regional labour market 
conditions potentially influence the effects of AE. Helpfully, the means of the regional 
employment rates are almost identical between treated and comparison groups. We do 
not take migration after AE into account when assessing the potential effects of AE 
since mobility may be an endogenous outcome of treatment.
7 The lower half of Table 
1 contains the corresponding descriptive characteristics of individuals born in 1944, 
i.e. controlling for age. The differences in averages for the treated and comparison 
groups display patterns similar to those in the upper half of the table.  
Table 2 presents descriptive data on the actual AE undertaken by the treated 
individuals. We observe the number of credits and the level of each course (i.e., 
compulsory or upper secondary); we also categorise each course based on its name. 
We do not observe whether the courses are completed, and there is no information on 
diplomas awarded. Course registrations on average amount to 390 credits for males 
and 458 credits for females, where 500 course credits correspond to a school year 
(Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents a histogram of the number of registered course 
credits among the treated).
8 We note that choices made by females and males are fairly 
different. For instance, the proportion of individuals who attended courses at the 
compulsory level was 28 per cent among women and 50 per cent among men. Almost 
60 per cent of the males attended at least one course labelled vocational. For females, 
the corresponding proportion is 36 per cent, while if one includes health-related 
courses in the category of “vocational”, the share is 83 per cent. Moreover, in addition 
                                                 
6 The policy until the mid-1990s was that in order not to generate perverse incentives, formal education was not 
offered as an active labour market program. 
7 Migration to another regional labour market is a very uncommon event in these age cohorts (Eliasson and 
Westerlund 2009).  
IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market?  9 to AE, on-the-job-training may be a factor for both treated and untreated individuals. 
We do not have information on this issue, but such training typically has relatively 
short duration, with low-skilled individuals underrepresented among the participants 
(Brunello 2001, Arulampala et al. 2004). It is possible that some individuals merely 
“consume” AE and attend a course in carpentry or a foreign language without the 
purpose of enhancing their labour market productivity. This is difficult to address 
because we do not know why individuals enrol; however, a rudimentary check is made 
in the empirical section insofar as we increase the lower bound of registered course 
credits in our definition of the treatment group. 





Total course credits  390.6 458.3
Standard deviation  (332.7) (458.0)
Compulsory level 
Proportion registered  .503 .280
Registered compulsory credits  175.7 94.3
Upper secondary level 
Proportion registered  .774 .871
Registered upper secondary credits  208.5 350.4
 




Social sciences  .398 .307
Natural sciences  .217 .120
Human sciences (e.g. foreign languages)  .079 .057
Computer sciences  .056 .054
Health-related subjects (e.g. nursing)  .044 .474
Vocational course  .584 .360
 
The outcome of interest in this study is the timing of the transition from productive 
work to dependence on transfers related to retirement pensions of different forms. The 
economics literature does not seem to have developed a consensus view on how to 
measure this transition (Denton and Spencer 2008). Our approach is to define a ratio, 
rit, for an individual i in year t between income from pensions pit and annual labour 
earnings eit (in 100s of SEK). The ratio can be written explicitly as 
                                                                                                                                             
 
8 The average among untreated individuals is 8.5 credits. In the empirical section, the mean among matched 
10  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? rit =
pit
eit +1 ()  
where (+1) is included in the denominator to avoid division by zero. For comparability 
with future studies, the empirical section contains several alternative threshold values 
of  rit, but our benchmark is that individuals are classified as active in the labour 
market as long as rit ≤ 1, meaning that the duration outcome is defined as the number 
of years, beginning in 1990, during which an individual has enjoyed labour earnings 
that exceed (or are equal to) the sum of pension transfers.
9 Duration may be censored 
due to events such as death, migration abroad, or enrolment in AE.
10 The latter is only 
possible for individuals in the untreated group. For our purposes, it is important that an 
observation satisfying our definition of retirement (rit > 1) is not followed by re-entry 
into the labour market (rit ≤ 1) in subsequent years. However, such events are rare and 
concern less than 1 per cent of the treated and untreated samples. Another issue is that 
of part-time retirees, who in our benchmark definition are assumed to remain in the 
labour force as long as their earnings exceed their pension transfers. This matter is 
addressed in the empirical section by allowing the threshold value of rit to vary. 
                                                                                                                                            
Figures 1 and 2 focus on treated and untreated individuals and separately describe 
their duration in the labour force using Kaplan-Meier survival functions, i.e. the 
proportion of individuals surviving (rit ≤ 1) at least up to year t. For both males and 
females, survival rates are significantly higher for the treated. This descriptive data is 
not expected to reflect a causal effect of AE. In particular, the average age of the 
treated is slightly lower, something that may drive the differences in survival rates. An 
alternative view of the same data is given in Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix, 
where the differences in survival functions between the treated and untreated are 
displayed. This is the format of illustration that we will use in the empirical section.  
To investigate how age may influence survival rates, Table 3 presents a snapshot of 
cohort-specific proportions of individuals still active on the labour market (rit < 1) in 
1997 among treated and untreated (proportions in italics).
11 As expected, the 
 
comparisons never exceeds 20 credits (i.e. about ten days) 
9 pit is the sum of part-time pensions, retirement (i.e. old-age) pensions, national supplementary pensions (ATP), 
and early-retirement pensions, including sickness pensions and various occupational pensions. 
10 Until 2004, the last year of observation, the proportion of censored individuals was below 4.5 per cent.  
11 The macroeconomic background made the probability of retirement higher during the economic downturn at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but note that the regime under which individuals retire is the same for the treated and the 
untreated at different points in time. 
IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market?  11 proportions defined as “active” tend to decrease with age, particularly as the age of 65 
approaches. In most occupations, the officially stated age of retirement is 65, but early 
retirement is generally allowed beginning at the age of 60.
12 More than 40 per cent of 
our sample is still classified as active on the labour market during the year in which 
they turn 64; thereafter, the percentages decrease to about 15 per cent at the age of 65 
and below 2 per cent at the age of 66. Among treated females, the proportion of 
individuals active on the labour market is higher than among untreated females. For 
males, the number of treated becomes somewhat low when separated into different 
cohorts, but a relatively stable pattern emerges as the treated demonstrate a  lower 
proportion of active individuals than untreated (except for 62- and 64-year-olds). It 
indicates that the higher survival rate for treated males displayed in Figure 1 was 
driven at least partially by their lower average age.  
Figure 1  Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival rates in the labour force 1990–2004. 






1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Treated lb ub Untreated lb ub
 
Note: lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound. 
 
                                                 
12 Blöndahl and Scarpetta (1999) estimate the average age of transition to inactivity in 1995. For Sweden, this was 
found to be 63 for males and 62 for females. The corresponding figures for the US were 64 and 62 years of age, and 
for Germany, they were 61 for males and 58 for females. Labour force participation and employment rates among 
55-64 year olds are higher in Sweden than the OECD average. See also Eklöf and Hallberg (2004, 2006) and 
Karlström et al. (2004). 
12  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? Figure 2   Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival rates in the labour force 1990–2004. 






1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Treated lb ub Untreated lb ub
 
Note: lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.  
 
Table 3 Proportions still active on the labour market in 1997.  
    
   Males  Females   
   Proportions with rit < 1 Proportions with rit < 1
Born  Age in 1997  NT / NU Treated  Untreated NT / NU Treated  Untreated
1940  57  116 / 25151  .767 .798  425 / 22536  .798 .765 
1939  58  112 / 25796  .741 .765  387 / 23508  .796 .729 
1938  59  92 / 24685  .696 .737  356 / 23436  .778 .706 
1937  60  66 / 24160  .591 .674  335 / 23184  .719 .656 
1936  61  66 / 23697  .545 .585  302 / 23195  .702 .603 
1935  62  70 / 23395  .629 .536  220 / 22780  .659 .554 
1934  63  53 / 22983  .321 .462  241 / 23096  .668 .506 
1933  64  43 / 22710  .442 .407  209 / 23073  .545 .454 
1932  65  36 / 23491  .111 .136  180 / 24502  .150 .120 
1931  66  26 / 23700  .000 .013  173 / 24685  .017 .011 
Note: NT / NU yields the number of individuals in the treated and the untreated group, respectively. 
 
3  Empirical method 
We aim to estimate the causal effect of AE on the timing of exit from the labour force, 
where AE and exit (rit > 1) are defined as in Section 2. For this purpose, we use the 
Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974, Holland, 1986) and the matching estimators 
adapted for duration outcomes in de Luna and Johansson (2007) and Fredriksson and 
Johansson (2008).  
IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market?  13 Our empirical strategy assumes a selection mechanism (into AE) based on 
observables. The presentation below includes a detailed discussion of why this 
assumption is reasonable in our context. 
For a given individual, let T(1) and T(0) denote the timing of his/her exit from the 
labour force if treated (AE) or not treated, respectively. One of these two potential 
outcomes will always be missing because we will observe the outcome either with or 
without AE. Treated individuals are matched with a comparison group, which we 
obtain by nearest-neighbour matching on the propensity score and by selecting four 
untreated individuals with propensity scores closest to those of each given participant 
in AE.
13 The propensity scores are estimated probabilities of being among the treated, 
using probit models (the choice of covariates is presented below). We define the 
causal effect of interest as the difference in the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival 
functions of the AE group and the matched comparison group. This provides an 
unbiased estimate of the causal effect under the following identifying assumptions (see 
de Luna and Johansson 2007 for a formal account):  
(A) An individual’s choice of enrolling in AE or not does not affect the outcomes of 
other individuals. 
(B) Conditional on the covariates, the probability of treatment is strictly positive and 
strictly smaller than one. 
(C) Conditional on the covariates, the mechanism of enrolment into AE is independent 
of the potential outcomes. 




In Table A.1 in the Appendix, the probit estimates of the propensity score are 
presented for females and males, while the results of the balancing tests are given in 
Table A.2 in the Appendix. The balancing tests involve all covariates that theoretically 
may explain AE enrolment, and they show that the AE and matched groups are 
comparable in the sense that, for any of the covariates, the equality of their respective 
                                                 
13 We match on the propensity score, i.e. the probability of entering AE conditional on the covariates; see 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for a theoretical justification. Matching all covariates may be difficult due to “the 
curse of dimensionality.” That is, finding close matches on many dimensions is not possible. 
14 As mentioned in Section 2, censoring is associated with death, migration abroad and, for the comparison group, 
enrolment in AE.  
14  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? mean values cannot be rejected. The balancing tests concern 14 year-of-birth-dummies 
also interacted with earnings in 1985 as well as earnings squared in 1985. Other 
variables are the earnings difference between 1985 and 1982, this same earnings 
difference squared, the level of regional employment, a dummy indicating if 
unemployment benefits were above zero in 1985 and a variable giving the amount of 
unemployment benefits actually received. Dummies are included to indicate 
educational levels, whether an individual is foreign-born, Nordic/non-Nordic country 
of origin, regional residence (Stockholm or inland of Norrland) and the number of 
children living at home (five or more is the upper limit). The explanatory variables in 
the probit models are a subset of these variables because over-parameterisation has 
been shown to increase the mean squared error and exacerbate the support problem 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005, Waernbaum 2008). Variables were thus excluded if 
associated with p-values of .2 or above. This rule-of-thumb was circumvented if the 
inclusion of a covariate was necessary to balance the AE and matched comparison 
groups. 
To identify causal effects of AE, it is crucial that assumption (C) above is not 
violated by unobservable factors that affect both AE participation and the timing of the 
exit. We see three main factors that can confound the effect of AE participation on exit 
from the labour force. First, individuals with a higher level of ability and/or motivation 
may systematically enrol in AE and, at some future point in time, decide to retire later 
as a result of the same characteristics that made them enrol. Conversely, if AE is 
considered a leisure activity, then participants might value leisure (and/or household 
work) more highly and thus tend to retire earlier. Third, geographical variations in 
enrolment may stem from regional heterogeneity in labour market conditions and/or 
social interaction effects, leading to a spurious correlation between the decision to 
enrol in AE and the timing of an exit from the labour force. To control for unobserved 
ability and/or motivation, we use indicators of individual’s unemployment, as well as 
1985 earnings and change in earnings during the period 1982–1985. An advantage 
with earnings is that it is a continuous variable with a fair amount of variation, 
reflecting both productivity and willingness to work (as it is composed of the level of 
wages and number of hours worked). Note also that zero earners were excluded in the 
construction of our samples (see Section 2). Via interaction variables, the coefficients 
associated with earnings and earnings squared in 1985 are allowed to vary between 
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several influential studies have found earnings before treatment to be a powerful 
control for self-selection into training programs (Heckman et al. 1999, Glazerman 
2003, Smith and Todd 2005). With respect to leisure preferences, we presume that 
those interested in AE as a leisure activity would only sporadically register for 
courses. This is one reason why we set the minimum threshold value at half a semester 
of full-time study to define AE and include robustness checks with even higher 
thresholds. Also, as earnings levels should contain information on individual 
preferences for leisure, as they partly reflect the number of hours worked, as well as an 
individual’s costs of leisure, as they partly reflect wage levels. Finally, to specifically 
control for geographical variations in labour market conditions or social interaction 
effects, our controls include regional employment. In addition, in a robustness check, 
we focus on residents in Stockholm to restrict the sample to one specific labour 
market. 
4  Results 
Using samples of treated and matched comparison groups, Figures 3 and 4 display the 
differences in Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival in the labour force for males and 
females respectively.
15 The differences in survival rates are small over the entire 
follow-up period, and the point-wise 95 per cent confidence intervals of the 
differences do not diverge from zero. Table A.3 in the Appendix lists the underlying 
levels of survival rates and confidence intervals.  
                                                 
15 An estimator for the variance of the estimator is given in de Luna and Johansson (2007, Sec. 4.2); using this tool, 
confidence intervals can be computed with a normal approximation. 
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Figure 3  Males, treated vs. matched comparison group differences in Kaplan-Meier 

























Note: lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.  
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Figure 4  Females, treated vs. matched comparison group differences in Kaplan-

























Note: lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.  
 
We can note that the substantial differences in survival rates indicated by the raw 
sample means presented earlier in Section 2 (see Figures 1 and 2 as well as Figures 
A.2 and A.3) do not apply when we control for heterogeneity in observables . To 
check the stability of these results, we employ three strategies; 1) alternative sub-
samples, 2) alternative definitions of the treatment group and 3) alternative definitions 
of the outcome variable. In the Appendix, Figures A.4 through A.13 provide an 
account of some of these estimates.
16 
First, we repeat the analysis, separately for males and females, conditioning on the 
following characteristics as observed in 1985: a) no upper secondary schooling 
(Figures A.4 and A.5); b) some upper secondary schooling; c) year of birth 1935–
1939; i.e. the youngest cohort turns 65 in 2004 (Figures A.6 and A.7); d) year of birth 
1940–1944; and e) place of residence is Stockholm (Figures A.8 and A.9). As with the 
full sample results, the differences in the point estimates of the survival rates are small 
                                                 
16 The full set of figures and confidence interval tables is available upon request from the authors. 
18  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? and there are no significant differences in the timing of the transition into retirement 
between the samples of treated and matched comparisons.
17 A different sampling 
aspect is that some individuals in the comparison group were registered in AE courses, 
but registrations amount to, on average, less than ten days of AE (less than 20 credits). 
Omitting these observations does not change our results. 
Second, the definition of treatment is altered. To begin with, we require a minimum 
of 250 registered credits (see Figures A.10 and A.11 in Appendix). However, the 
estimation results are not substantially different from what has been presented above. 
The same applies if the minimum number of course credit registrations is set to 500 
(i.e. equal to a schooling year) as well as when we conditioned on the content of the 
AE courses, notably with respect to vocational courses for males and health-related 
studies for females.  
Third, we turn to alternative definitions of retirement. We first address whether the 
results are sensitive to our treatment of part-time retirees by using different threshold 
values of rit > 1.2, .8, and 0, with the last defining the timing of retirement as the first 
year when pension income exceeds zero (Figures A.12 and A.13). Regardless of the 
definition of the outcome, the estimations have the same implications as before; that 
is, there are no significant differences in the timing of retirement between matched 
groups of treated and comparison groups. Next, because we may underestimate the 
measure of labour market activity by using earnings, we add unemployment benefits 
to the denominator of rit. However, this has little effect on the estimates. Nevertheless, 
one might argue that unemployment benefit transfers are received in a transition 
period from employment to retirement (Hallberg 2003). In such a case, our ratio rit 
would instead exaggerate attachment to the labour force. If, for example, the untreated 
use this transition path more often, our estimated effects of AE on survival rates may 
be biased downwards. To check whether this is a problem, we compared the incidence 
and levels of unemployment benefits for 59- to 65-year-olds in each year in the period 
1996-2004 for treated and untreated individuals. In the matched groups of males, there 
were no significant differences in incidence or levels. For females, equality in 
incidence could not be rejected for any year, while the benefit levels were significantly 
                                                 
17 The point estimates sometimes tend to be below zero. Although estimates are very small and not significantly 
different from zero, a negative effect on the survival rate is of course theoretically feasible, as described in the 
introduction. 
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2002. We conclude that this particular aspect does not seem to be of crucial 
importance.  
Although it may seem a reasonable hypothesis, and despite running a number of 
robustness checks, we do not find any indications that additional investments in 
education at later stages of working life influence the retirement age. One may 
speculate regarding possible explanations for our findings. It may be the case that we 
have captured many individuals who merely “consumed” education. In other words, 
the motives behind these individuals’ enrolment decisions may not have been related 
to labour market outcomes. This argument, however, requires that the consumption of 
education entails large amounts of AE because the results are robust to definitions of 
treatment that correspond to a year of full-time study measured in terms of course 
registrations. The “consumption of AE” argument is also contradicted by the positive 
earnings effects of AE reported in Stenberg and Westerlund (2008) and Stenberg 
(2009) as well as those reported using US data in Jacobson (2005b). A different 
interpretation would be that a positive earnings effect generates an income effect that 
increases the demand for leisure, potentially counterbalancing a positive effect on 
labour supply. In addition, the timing of AE enrolment in our sample, 1986–1989, 
coincides with a strong economic expansion period with low levels of unemployment. 
We cannot necessarily expect our results to generalise to all phases of a business cycle 
because different macroeconomic conditions may attract different groups of 
participants. 
5  Summary and discussion 
This paper has analysed whether adult education (AE) for prime-aged individuals at 
the compulsory or upper secondary level can be used as a policy measure to increase 
labour force participation during the later stages of working life. To answer this 
question, extended time-series data on AE and earnings are necessary. We use unique 
panel data on AE transcripts and annual earnings across 1979–2004 and 1982–2004, 
respectively. We further exploit the fact that, by international standards, AE has been 
exceptionally prevalent in Sweden.   
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of individuals aged 42–55 (in 1986) 
with short educations. The groups we define as treated enrolled in AE during the 
20  IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market? period 1986–1989. Matching on the propensity score is used to generate untreated 
comparison groups of non-participants. Potential effects on duration in the labour 
force are examined until 2004, i.e., up to and beyond the officially stated age of 
retirement. Our findings indicate that AE had no significant effect on the survival rate 
in the labour force. The results are robust with respect to alternative definitions of the 
timing of retirement and alternative definitions of treatment; they are also unchanged 
if we study sub-samples conditioned on year of birth, (prior-to-enrolment) educational 
levels or Stockholm residents.  
Retraining the older workforce is often presumed to extend working life and is a 
cornerstone of both the European Union’s so-called “Lisbon strategy” for growth and 
jobs and the OECD campaign for “active ageing”. The results of this study indicate no 
effect of these efforts on the timing of the transition from labour force participation 
into retirement, thus weakening the economic rationale for AE in this case. According 
to our findings, proponents of AE for older workers would have to argue on the basis 
of its potentially positive effects on individual productivity while they remain in the 
labour force, and/or need to emphasize issues such as fairness, social equity, increased 
democracy and other similar considerations often included in the officially stated goals 
for publicly financed AE. As always, further studies that explore different economic 
environments will need to be conducted before stronger and more general conclusions 
can be drawn. 
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Dependent variable: Course registrations in AE 1986-1989 exceeding 124 credits.
 
  Males Females
 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
 
Born 1931 
  - .743
*** (.096) -  .450
*** (.097) 
 
Born 1932   - .582
*** (.080) -  .532
*** (.097)  
Born 1933   - .483
*** (.079) -  .484
*** (.091)  
Born 1934   - .460
*** (.069) -  .427
*** (.091)  
Born 1935   - .334
*** (.071) -  .514
*** (.097)  
Born 1936 
  - .359
*** (.072) -  .295
*** (.081) 
 
Born 1937   - .335
*** (.073) -  .198
*** (.075)  
Born 1938   - .254
*** (.068) -  .412
*** (.087)  
Born 1939   - .206
*** (.064) -  .166
** (.072)   
Born 1940   - .142
** (.066)  -  .077  (.068)   
Born 1941   - .165
*** (.063) -  .131
* (.067)   
Born 1942   - .125
** (.058)  -  .051  (.063)   
Born 1943   - .072  (.061)  - .068  (.061)   
         
Foreign-born .112
*** (.027) .027  (.022)   
Born outside Scandinavia      - .074
* (.038)   
Unemployment benefits 1985 > 0 
a) .219
*** (.048) .242
*** (.031)  
Unemployment benefits 1985  -.000 (.000)  -.000 (.000)   
9 years of schooling
  .303
*** (.030) .164
*** (.020)  
1 year of upper secondary school  .393
*** (.071) .516
*** (.015)  
2 years of upper secondary school  .245
*** (.020) .244
*** (.019)  
- Commerce   -  .066
*** (.023)  
- Manufacturing   -  .095
** (.038)   
- Transport   -  .291
*** (.048)  
Regional employment  1.507
*** (.495) 1.189
*** (.179)  
Stockholm  county         
Inland of Norrland  .064  (.044)  .076
*** (.024)  
1 child at home  .046
* (.025)  .097
*** (.015)  
2 children  .043
* (.025)  .138
*** (.016)  
3 children  .103
*** (.034) .186
*** (.025)  
4 children  .093  (.068)  .231
*** (.050)  
5 or more children  .133  (.112)  .236
** (.095)   
Earnings  1985  .000 (.000)      
Earnings 1985 squared  - .000
*** (.000) -  .000
*** (.000)  
Earnings difference 1982-1985      .000
*** (.000)  
Earnings difference 1982-1985 squared      .000
* (.000)   
    
Birth-year dummies * earnings 1985 
b No  Yes  
Birth-year dummies * earnings 1985 sq. 
b 
Yes Yes  
Notes: 
*** significant at the 1 % level.
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
a) Dummy variable. 
b 13 coefficients, not displayed. 
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Table A. 2 Balancing tests of covariates between treated and matched comparison groups. 
















  1341 5300    4957 18702   
Registered AE credits 
  391.3 9.27  .000  457.3 16.7  .000 
Age 46.34 46.33  .964  46.92 46.87  .531 
Born 1931 
  .019 .018  .803  .035 .035  .935 
Born 1932   .026 .026  .927  .036 .036  .968 
Born 1933   .032 .034  .828  .042 .041  .762 
Born 1934   .040 .043  .697  .048 .046  .569 
Born 1935   .052 .054  .813  .044 .046  .725 
Born 1936 
  .049 .050  .912  .061 .060  .924 
Born 1937   .049 .055  .474  .067 .065  .702 
Born 1938   .069 .063  .546  .071 .068  .581 
Born 1939   .084 .079  .646  .078 .078  .985 
Born 1940   .085 .077  .426  .085 .084  .864 
Born 1941   .094 .095  .895  .089 .090  .881 
Born 1942   .123 .120  .836  .099 .100  .834 
Born 1943   .119 .114  .707  .116 .118  .702 
Born 1944   .160 .173  .364  .130 .133  .640 
Earnings 1985 
b) 944.36 950.82  .734  617.37 623.74  .281 
Earnings difference 1982-1985 
b) 184.60 201.39 .213  161.11 164.12  .505 
Earnings 1985 of born 1931 
b) 19.10 16.99  .705  22.25 22.65  .877 
Earnings 1985 of born 1932 
b) 27.50 27.27  .975  21.51 22.62  .660 
Earnings 1985 of born 1933 
b) 31.22 32.85  .831  26.85 26.40  .873 
Earnings 1985 of born 1934 
b) 39.38 45.14  .531  30.01 29.45  .851 
Earnings 1985 of born 1935 
b) 50.61 56.02  .579  28.83 29.70  .770 
Earnings 1985 of born 1936 
b) 45.39 46.94  .865  37.99 37.69  .929 
Earnings 1985 of born 1937 
b) 44.41 53.90  .305  41.41 39.83  .643 
Earnings 1985 of born 1938 
b) 66.26 58.64  .457  46.14 45.65  .892 
Earnings 1985 of born 1939 
b) 80.76 74.80  .603  48.56 48.54  .997 
Earnings 1985 of born 1940 
b) 78.72 74.01  .669  51.88 52.38  .897 
Earnings 1985 of born 1941 
b) 91.12 93.15  .869  56.30 57.36  .793 
Earnings 1985 of born 1942 
b) 116.65 120.11  .807   59.77  60.36  .885 
Earnings 1985 of born 1943 
b) 107.85 .99.31  .496  70.67 71.25  .895 
Earnings 1985 of born 1944 
b) 145.38 151.69  .669  75.21 79.85  .314 
        
Foreign-born .178 .182  .782  .140 .140  .965 
Foreign-born from Scandinavia .084 .087  .796  .073 .074  .908 
Born outside Scandinavia  .094 .095  .908  .067 .066  .856 
Unemployment benefits 1985 > 0  .111 .123  .352  .093 .096  .718 
Unemployment benefits 1985 
b) 20.27 22.25  .517  13.77 14.02  .834 
Less than 9 years of schooling  .374 .382  .676  .280 .278  .797 
9 years of schooling
  .140 .135  .705  .115 .119  .574 
1 year of upper secondary school  .022 .022  .895  .303 .303  .974 
2 years of upper secondary 
school 
.464 .460  .854  .302 .300  .861 
- Commerce  .065 .057  .420  .122 .119  .601 
- Manufacturing  .280 .284  .830  .026 .026  .975 
- Transport  .034 .039  .505  .013 .146  .520 
Regional employment  .835 .835  .847  .767 .767  .808 
Stockholm county  .178 .173  .732  .175 .174  .942 
Inland of Norrland  .060 .053  .380  .064 .063  .918 
Number of children at home  1.272 1.280  .854  1.244 1.250  .763 
1 child at home  .253 .255  .921  .327 .320  .465 
2 children  .281 .278  .838  .287 .287  .956 
3 children  .107 .114  .570  .085 .088  .561 
4 children  .022 .023  .897  .016 .016  .826 
5 or more children  .008 .008  .529  .004 .006  .350 
a) T-test of equality between treated and matched comparison means. 
b) In 100s of SEK; equal mean values of squared terms are also rejected but not displayed. 
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comparison groups. 
           
  Males      Females   
   Survival  rate,   
95 % confidence intervals
   Survival  rate, 

















1990 1341  / 
5300 
1  1    4957 / 18853  1  1 
1991 1246  / 
4936 
.964 - .982  .977 - .985    4723 / 17271  .970 - .979  .967 - .972 
1992 1208  / 
4812 
.938 - .962  .942 - .955    4591 / 16697  .940 - .953  .939 - .946 
1993 1176  / 
4625 
.896 - .927  .906 - .922    4451 / 16177  .900 - .916  .904 - .913 
1994 1120  / 
4428 
.859 - .896  .876 - .893    4253 / 15558  .870 - .889  .872 - .881 
1995 1070  / 
4258 
.830 - .870  .848 - .868    4114/ 14956  .840 - .861  .841 - .852 
1996 1030  / 
4101 
.798 - .840  .815 - .837    3960 / 14398  .800 - .823  .802 - .814 
1997  986 / 3918  .746 - .794  .774 - .797    3763 / 13711  .755 - .779  .752 - .765 
1998  923 / 3705  .698 - .748  .736 - .761    3540 / 12823  .707 - .732  .707 - .720 
1999  859 / 3505  .655 - .707  .693 - .719    3307 / 11994  .648 - .675  .656 - .670 
2000  802 / 3290  .593 - .648  .637 - .664    3022 / 11108  .588 - .616  .599 - .614 
2001  726 / 2996  .548 - .604  .583 - .611    2737 / 10121  .521 - .550  .539 - .554 
2002  668 / 2726  .490 - .546  .530 - .559    2425 / 9067  .452 - .481  .478 - .493 
2003  597 / 2465  .427 - .483  .473 - .502    2103 / 8008  .397 - .426  .419 - .434 
2004  440 / 1889  .357 - .413  .409 - .438    1553 / 5971  .335 - .363  .354 - .372 
Note: NT / NC yields the number of individuals in the treated and the matched comparison group. 
 
 
IFAU – Can adult education delay retirement from the labour market?  29 Figure A. 2 Males, unmatched samples. Treated vs. untreated differences in Kaplan-

























Note: No. of obs., see Table A.3, lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound. 
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Figure A. 3 Females, unmatched samples. Treated vs. untreated differences in 

























Note: No. of obs., see Table A.3, lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper 
bound.
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Figure A. 4 Males with no upper secondary education in 1985. Treated vs. matched 

























Note: NT / NC = 690/2741. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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Figure A. 5  Females with no upper secondary education in 1985. Treated vs. 

























Note: NT / NC = 1961/7637. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound. 
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Figure A. 6 Males born 1935–1939. Treated vs. matched comparison group 


























Note: NT / NC = 406/1597. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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Figure A. 7 Females born 1935–1939. Treated vs. matched comparison group 

























Note: NT / NC = 1592/5808. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound. 
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Figure A. 8 Males residing in Stockholm in 1985. Treated vs. matched comparison 

























Note: NT / NC = 239/938. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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Figure A. 9 Females residing in Stockholm in 1985. Treated vs. matched comparison 

























Note: NT / NC = 867/3282. lb = lower bound of 95  per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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Figure A. 10 Males treated with at least 250 registered course credits. Treated vs. 

























Note: NT / NC = 696/2746. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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Figure A. 11 Females treated with at least 250 registered course credits. Treated vs. 

























Note: NT / NC = 2845/10937. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound. 
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Figure A. 12 Exit defined by the time pensions (pit) > zero; males. Treated vs. 

























Note: NT / NC = 1341/5300. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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Figure A. 13 Exit defined by time pensions (pit) > zero; females. Treated vs. matched 

























Note: NT / NC = 4957/18702. lb = lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval; ub = upper bound.
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